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This paper analyzes the implications of global rebalancing in the 
post-crisis period for Korea and how high leverage in the household 
and SME sectors could affect this process.  Consumption and 
investment in Korea appear in line with that of peers, but there are 
limits how much they could be sustained in the post crisis world to pick 
up the slack from a lower external demand.  To avoid the build-up of 
vulnerabilities from high leverage, households have to increase their 
saving rate limiting consumption growth.  On the other hand, export-
oriented and large corporates may need to invest less with lower export 
demand increasing corporate savings further.  This would leave SMEs 
in the non-tradable sector as the engines for investment, employment 
and household income growth, increasing the urgency to address their 
long-standing structural problems and weak balance sheets.  Delaying 
the necessary adjustment would increase costs and financial 
vulnerabilities.  Improving social safety nets and the pensions system 
would be important to manage the adjustment costs while increasing 
labor market flexibility.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The global crisis has highlighted the importance of rebalancing growth for 
Asia to lessen its dependence on exports, improve its resilience to external 
demand shocks and sustain high growth rates in the face of waning exports to 
advanced economies as they repair their balance sheets.   
Within the region, Korea stands out in many aspects.  Although the 
Korean economy remains heavily dependent on the tradable sector, Korea’s 
current account surpluses have not been excessive.  This is reflected in 
consumption and investment levels consistent with OECD averages.  Hence, 
the paper will argue that rebalancing growth in Korea would not simply mean 
sustaining domestic demand growth but also shifting production, investment 
and employment structures tied to export-oriented industries to nontradables.  
This shift would require finding new domestic engines of growth that can be 
financed by healthy balance sheets.  However, Korean households and the 
SMEs, the key actors to generate this shift, are highly leveraged.  This could 
limit their ability to facilitate the new engines of growth and would require 
an appropriate sequencing of policies to minimize adjustment costs. 
The first section of the paper discusses the implications of global 
rebalancing for Korea using simulations from the IMF’s Global Integrated 
Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF).  The second section focuses on how 
rebalancing growth in Korea is different than in the rest of the region and 
discusses the challenges of highly leveraged households and SMEs for the 
rebalancing process.  The last section concludes with policy recommenda-
tions.  
 
 
2. IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL REBALANCING  
FOR KOREA 
 
Economic growth in Korea depends heavily on external demand.  
Although Korea’s export ―exposure‖ — defined as the share of value added 
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linked to external demand — at 30%, is not one of the highest in the region 
and not excessive relative to the OECD, exports have remained the engine of 
growth contributing 68% to growth between 2001 and 2007.  This may be 
surprising when contrasted with the contribution of net exports to growth in 
national accounts, which accounted only for 18% of growth in the same 
period, albeit well above the OECD averages.  This is because the net export 
based measure understates the dependence of incomes on external demand if 
incomes are spent on imports whereas the value added based measure 
captures this effect.
1)
  When the share of domestic investment tied to exports 
is also accounted for Korea’s exposure to external demand would go up by 4 
ppt to 34 and total contribution of export value added to growth would reach 
73%.  
 
 
                                           
1) Export based measures will also overstate the role of exports as a source of growth, as 
increasing vertical trade integration means that exports include a declining share of 
domestically produced value added.  Asian international input-output (AIO) tables were 
used to measure the extent to which the value added produced in an economy can be 
attributed to domestic, intraregional, and extra-regional demand.  For details see Regional 
Economic Outlook, April 2010 (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2010/APD/eng/ 
areo0410.htm). 
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Figure 3 Selected Asia: Share of Export Value Added in GDP 
(in Percent) 
Sources: AIO 2000 and IMF Staff Estimates. 
Figure 2 Selected Asia: Average Contribution to Real GDP Growth
1)
  
(in Percent of Real GDP Growth) 
Notes: 1) Average of contributions to 3-year growth rates between 2001-2007.  Exchange 
rate adjusted deflator.  2) Latin America includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
2) 
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  Notwithstanding increasing intra-regional trade and the emergence of 
China as a final destination of its exports, the advanced economies remain 
the most important source of external demand for Korea.  China is now 
Korea’s biggest export market (23% of total exports) and cyclically export 
growth to China was a key reason behind the rapid recovery from the Great 
Recession.  Nonetheless, Korea lags behind Taiwan Province of China, 
Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines in benefiting from growing domestic 
demand in China. 
 
 
As a result, the deleveraging in advanced economies in the post-crisis 
period will mean lower external demand for Korea.  Simulations with an 
expanded version of the IMF’s GIMF model were used to assess the 
implication of a rebalancing in the U.S. on Korea.2)  A decline in external 
demand associated with a two percentage point (ppt) permanent increase in 
U.S. private savings rate could reduce Korean exports by 6 ppt and GDP 
                                           
2) For technical details of the model see N’Diaye et al. (2010).  Simulations are from REO, 
April 2010. 
Figure 4 Export Impact from U.S. and China Rebalancing
1)
 
(Cumulative Percent Difference from Baseline in 3 Years) 
Note: 1) Assumes U.S. (China) private saving increase (decrease) by 2 percentages 
points of GDP. 
Source: IMF Staff Calculations. 
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growth by one ppt in the next three years from their respective current IMF 
baseline forecasts.  Furthermore, a similar rebalancing of growth in China — 
through lower private savings — alone will not fully offset the lack of 
external demand from the U.S. Positive spillovers from greater Chinese 
demand would at best mitigate 40% of the adverse shock on Korea.  One 
important reason is that, despite high growth, China has remained a marginal 
importer of consumer goods — accounting for only 3% of global imports — 
while the United States still dominates global imports, both in terms of direct 
and indirect trade linkages.  At current speeds it would take another decade 
for China to take over from advanced economies in leading export value 
added in Korea, notwithstanding the adjustment costs to reorient production 
to the Chinese customer basket, which is quite different than that in advanced 
economies.3) 
 
 
3. HOW CAN KOREA REBALANCE ITS GROWTH? 
 
Despite its high export dependence Korea has small current account 
surpluses, which mask shifts in underlying balance sheets of the households 
and corporates.  Korea’s current account surplus is not excessive and unlike 
most of the region has been declining since the Asian crisis.  This trend is 
driven by a larger decline in savings than in the region — although 
investment has also declined (see below).  In addition, unlike most of Asia, 
this reflects a larger increase in corporate savings that has been largely offset 
by lower household savings. 
                                           
3) Measured by an import similarity index based on SITC-5 digit data comprising over 300 line 
items for consumer goods, the consumer goods basket imported by China overlaps by only 
about 35% with that in other advanced economies. 
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High leverage of the household sector could limit consumption growth in 
the post-crisis world.  Consumption growth in Korea is consistent with 
fundamentals and at par with peers in the OECD.  However, it has been 
sustained by increasing debt levels, making Korean households one of the 
most financially leveraged with household debt reaching 80% of GDP.  
Leverage is even higher when real wealth is considered, despite the relatively 
lower diversification of Korean households into financial assets.  The 
increase in leverage has also coincided with a sharp drop in the household 
saving rate (see, Appendix).  As the recent U.S. experience shows, a debt-
financed consumption growth cannot be sustained forever without the build-
up of substantial vulnerabilities, although in Korea this is not driven by 
external indebtness.  This would mean that households would have to 
deleverage either by curtailing consumption growth or by increasing incomes 
or a combination of both.  
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Figure 5 Saving-Investment Balance and Current Account 
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2009-2001; 1996-2000) 
Source: WEO. 
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The structure of household lending has limited financial risks but increased 
consumption volatility.  In fact only about one-third of household debt in 
Korea is tied to residential mortgages (two-thirds in the OECD on average) 
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Figure 6  Asia: Consumption Relative to Steady-state
1)
 
(in Percent of GDP) 
Notes: 1) Based on staff estimates of S-I balance using CGER’s Macroeconomic 
balance approach.  2) Other emerging economies include Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Israel, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, South 
Africa, and Turkey. 
2) 
Figure 7 Debt as a Percent of Net Wealth
1)
 
Note: 1) Net wealth is defined as non-financial assets minus liabilities.  For Japan 
and Germany the latest observation is 2007 and for UK 2008. 
Sources: OECD and IMF Staff Estimates. 
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and strict loan-to-value and debt-to-income-regulations limit excessive 
leveraging through home ownership.  Nonetheless, 90% of household loans 
are at floating market interest rates making household consumption more 
vulnerable to interest rate shocks and the business cycle.
4)
  As a result — and 
despite wider access to finance — consumption volatility has increased three-
fold since 1998, and rather than smoothing aggregate activity, consumption 
now amplifies its volatility.   
 
Consumption growth will depend on the amount of leverage that can be 
sustained by the households.  Finding the optimal nexus of consumption and 
leverage for the household sector is not straightforward and would depend on 
the extent to which the build-up has reflected structural and cyclical factors, 
such as financial deepening and a low interest rate environment, and the 
degree to which the substantial increase in households’ gearing has been 
                                           
4) In the USA (2005), EU (2004) and UK (2004) variable rate mortgages constituted 31%, 
46% and 72% of all mortgages, respectively.  The LTVs in Korea have been declining 
against the global trend, going down from 56.4 at end-2004 to 47 at end-2007.  The global 
average is 80%.  
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excessive and needs to be unwound.  Nonetheless, a simple model of 
household debt dynamics can be used to demonstrate the unsustainability of 
the current path.  Assuming an effective nominal interest rate on existing 
household debt of 6% and a future nominal growth rate of disposable income 
of 6% — both reflecting recent averages, — debt-to-income ratio would 
stabilize around the current 140%.  However, regulatory tightening globally 
and in Korea and a gradual return to neutral interest rates are expected to 
increase carrying cost of debt and limit credit growth forcing deleveraging.  
A gradual 200 bps increase in interest rates from this baseline by 2013 and a 
decline in the debt-to-income ratio to 100% by 2030 would require 
households to spend an improbable 70% of projected disposable income by 
2030 on debt repayments leaving little to consume.  Obviously, these numbers 
are illustrative and meant to demonstrate the potential constraints on 
consumption growth even a gradual deleveraging would entail.  Even in the 
absence of deleveraging sustaining consumption growth with higher carrying 
costs would be difficult and would act as a medium-term drag on overall 
economic activity, but especially on SMEs, who depend more on domestic 
demand.  
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  The adjustment of households’ balance sheet is unlikely to be uniform 
across households as the most rapid debt growth has been registered at the 
higher and lower income levels.  While high income households seem to 
have borrowed heavily to invest in real estate low income households tend to 
do so for consumption.  It is estimated that more than 13% of households in 
the bottom 20% income group have debt payments over 40% of their income 
(Hahm et al., 2009).  To the extent low income groups tend to have a higher 
marginal propensity to consume, the impact of deleveraging on aggregate 
consumption could be even higher.
5)
 
 
Slower export growth in the post-crisis period could also limit domestic 
investment.  While current aggregate investment levels in Korea are close to 
their long-term average and still-high by developed country standards 
investment growth since the Asian crisis has been driven by larger companies, 
who also dominate Korea’s exports.6)  Slower export growth in the post-crisis 
                                           
5) Karasulu (2008) estimates that low income groups’ propensity to consume out of current 
period income is about 5 times as high as that of the overall population. 
6)
 Pre-1998 investment levels were at historic highs despite relatively subdued corporate 
indicators, and are difficult to rationalize based on economic fundamentals.  See Syed, 2007. 
Figure 10 Household Saving Rate and Leverage by Income Quantile 
(As a Percent of Disposable Income) 
Source: Korea National Statistics Office and Hahm et al. (2009). 
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world could lead large cooperates to reduce domestic investment, even as 
they increase FDI to the region to benefit from lower labor costs elsewhere. 
 
 
The only offsetting factor would be investment by domestically-oriented 
companies, the majority of which are SMEs.  However, unlike the chaebol, 
the SMEs have lagged behind, largely reflecting weaker fundamentals in the 
aftermath of the Asian crisis.  Small firms also tend to dominate the services 
sector (representing around 85% of firms), where productivity growth has 
been lackluster.
7) 
 Looking ahead, a vibrant SME sector, especially in the 
nontradable sector will be vital for investment growth and sustaining high 
rates of growth.  With their decades long focus on export-oriented 
manufacturing large corporates do not have the experience or the incentives 
to invest in services.  In addition should they reorient themselves to the 
nontradable sector this could have implications for domestic competition 
policy.  
                                           
7) Productivity in services in Korea is relatively low at 58% of the manufacturing and 44% of 
the U.S. service sector. 
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However, the rapid expansion of credit guarantees for SMEs after the 
Asian crisis and the Great Recession have held back needed restructuring. 
Between 1997-2001, SME credit guarantees roughly doubled in size, 
reaching a peak of nearly 8% of GDP, compared to only 1.5% of GDP in 
Taiwan Province of China, 0.2% in the United States and 0.6% in France.  
Unwinding such support has also proven difficult.  The size and coverage 
were only partially pared back during the subsequent recovery, and rose 
again following the Great Recession, reaching 6% of GDP (highest in non-
Japan Asia).  In addition to expanding the size of guarantees, their coverage 
was also increased and terms made more generous, although the authorities 
are in the process of scaling them back to pre-crisis levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 Facility Investment (1990=100) 
Sources: The Federation of Korean Industries and IMF Staff Estimate. 
Figure 13 Debt Ratio and Ordinary Income to Sales (in Percent) 
Source: BOK Financial Statement Analysis. 
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Furthermore, SME guarantees favor repeat clients and do not provide 
incentives to banks to develop new instruments suitable for the SMEs in the 
services sector.  Given the high degree of coverage, Korean banks tend to 
direct loans to those SMEs that can secure credit guarantees which are 
overwhelmingly well established firms.
8)
  Although these guarantees are 
typically given for only one year, they are usually rolled over, or were 
required to be rolled over following the global crisis.  Therefore, the bulk of 
guarantees outstanding are directed toward existing firms, creating a barrier 
to new entrants.  As a result, low profitability of existing SMEs and the 
financing constraints for the newcomers limit their ability to invest.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to the guarantees policy support to SMEs through other 
channels is sizable.  Besides the loans of the dedicated policy banks (IBK 
and KDB) and the government-run Small Business Corporation, SMEs also 
benefit from regulatory lending requirements on banks.
9)
  Domestic banks are 
                                           
8) While more than 70% of KCGF guarantees have a one-year maturity, the typical firm has 
been under KCGF coverage for five years.  More than 30% of KOTEC guarantees went not 
to start-ups but to established companies older than three years. 
9) Lee et al. (2009) estimate that the share of total policy support to SMEs constitutes 30% of 
their funding, while bank loans (with or out without guarantees) account for 62%. 
Figure 14 SME Guarantees (in Percent of GDP) 
Source: IMF Staff Estimates. 
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mandated to allocate a certain portion of their won loan book to SMEs.  
Since 1997, the minimum for commercial banks is 45% and for regional 
banks 60%.  Foreign branches are subject to a 25% or 35% requirement 
depending on their use of the Bank of Korea (BOK)’s discount window.  
For mutual savings banks and credit specialized financing companies,
10)
 
loans to SMEs must be between 30 to 50%
11)
 of total outstanding loans.  In 
addition the BOK operates a credit facility at favorable terms for on-lending 
to SMEs. 
The prospects of households are closely tied with SMEs, especially in the 
non-tradable sector.  The distinction between households and ―mom and 
pop‖ shops is blurred as 88% of companies operate as micro-enterprises.12)  
SMEs dominate the services sector and depend on domestic consumption 
more than the large firms tying closely investment in the sector with 
employment growth.  This suggests that addressing SMEs weaknesses in the 
services sector would go a long way supporting household income growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
10) Credit-specialized financial companies (CSFCs) consist of credit card companies, leasing 
companies, installment finance companies, and new technology venture capital companies. 
11) For mutual saving banks the requirement encompasses household loans as well.  
12)
 As a result reported SME loans, which rely only on commercial bank data, appear to 
underestimate SME debt by about 30% while misclassification overstates household loans. 
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Cognizant of the need to rebalance growth toward the nontradable sector 
the Korean government launched a major initiative in May 2009 to develop 
services.  As part of its strategy to create new ―engines of growth‖ the 
government identified nine service sectors, including heath care, education, 
green financing, software, and conventions and tourism to support.  However, 
the choice was based on their potential to reduce Korea’s deficit in service 
trade rather than addressing the broader problems in the SMEs and the 
services sector.  The plan targets a more level playing field between services 
and manufacturing by increasing the tax incentives, fiscal aid and SME 
support to the level of manufacturing.  For example, knowledge-based 
services are being given more government credit guarantees and to increase 
the amount of SME assistance received in the service sector, the government 
greatly relaxed the requirements for service firms to be classified as SMEs.
13)
  
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Rebalancing growth from exports to services with leveraged actors will 
require action on multiple fronts and a careful balancing act.   Delaying 
SME restructuring would undermine a sustained increase in investment and 
employment growth in the non-tradable sector and feed the incentives for 
more leverage.  Efforts to restructure SMEs should start with scaling back 
SME guarantees back to international norms, while resisting temptations to 
use industrial policy for the new engines of growth in the non-tradable sector. 
At a minimum the regulatory requirements to lend to SMEs should be 
gradually eliminated to encourage banks to assess risks and opportunities and 
improve the efficiency of capital allocation.  This would include developing 
new instruments suitable for the SMEs in the services sector and reduce 
dependence on limited collateral, such as real assets.  
Leveling the playing field between services and manufacturing would be 
                                           
13) OECD, Economic Review-Korea, 2010. 
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crucial in rebalancing and sustaining growth.  However, this would be better 
achieved by reducing support to the latter, rather than, as planned, extending 
more government guarantees and payments to service firms, notably to SMEs.  
Rather than service industry-specific measures broader policies to strengthen 
competition in services by eliminating domestic entry barriers, accelerating 
regulatory reform, upgrading competition policy and reducing barriers to 
trade and inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) would be needed to 
improve productivity in services.  
Maintaining a robust consumption growth while avoiding an abrupt 
deleveraging of households will require a combination of policies to support 
incomes, ease transition costs and further develop the financial sector to 
better intermediate the risks now born by households.  A carefully planned 
sequencing of labor market policies and increased social protection for 
unemployed would be crucial to minimize the adjustment costs until 
restructuring of the SMEs can unleash new sources of employment and 
income growth (see, Eskesen, 2010).  Addressing the seniority system in the 
labor market, while increasing the coverage of and the contribution to the 
pension system, would improve formal employment opportunities for the 
aging population and support household incomes.  Developing mortgage 
financing further and addressing the structural problems in the housing sector 
would also go a long way in addressing the financial risks inappropriately 
born by the households who cannot diversify them. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Are Korean Households Saving Too Little? 
 
Korean households’ savings rate dropped from 27% to 7.5% of disposable 
household income since 1998 and remains one of the lowest in the OECD.  
This has coincided with a steady increase in household debt and raised 
concerns for sustainability of consumption and financial stability.  Aggregate 
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household debt as a percent of reported
14)
 disposable income has reached 
143% and Koreans spend 7% of their income to service debt, more than the 
U.S. households.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A cross-country panel regression was used to explain the dynamics of the 
household saving rate in Korea.
15)
  An unbalanced panel regression 
comprising 20 countries was estimated using GMM with country dummies 
and lagged values of the variables as instruments. 
Regression results suggest that the decline in the Korean households’ 
saving rate is consistent with fundamentals.  Without even accounting for 
Korea specific factors, beyond those captured by the various regressors, the 
decline in Korean household savings rate can be reasonably predicted by the 
model.  Decomposing the estimates into their respective contribution to the 
household savings few key conclusions emerge: 
                                           
14) Survey data suggests that underreporting of household incomes may overstate the debt ratio 
by about 22%, consistent with the estimated size of the informal economy. 
15)
 The countries are Korea, United States, United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, 
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand.  The longest series in the 
unbalanced sample starts in 1970 and ends in 2008. 
Figure A1 Household Saving Rate 
1) 
Note: 1) includes the OECD countries in the sample. 
Source: OECD. 
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Table A1 Determinants of Household Saving 
(in Percent of Household Disposable Income) 
 Coefficients P-value
4)
 
GDP per Capital
1)
 
Old Age Dependency Ratio
2)
 
Young Age Dependency Ratio
2)
 
Effective Retirement Age
3)
 
Terms-of-Trade 
Real Household Disposable Income Growth 
Corporate Saving / GDP 
Public Saving / GDP 
Real Interest Rate 
Real Stock Prices 
Inflation Rate 
Unemployment Rate 
Household Credit / GDP 
0.000 
–0.257 
0.214 
–0.534 
0.052 
0.310 
–0.472 
–0.464 
0.332 
0.001 
0.529 
0.177 
–0.045 
(0.008)
**
 
(0.010)
**
 
(0.033)
**
 
(0.000)
***
 
(0.000)
 *** 
(0.000)
***
 
(0.000)
***
 
(0.000)
***
 
(0.001)
***
 
(0.003)
***
 
(0.000)
***
 
(0.076)
*
 
(0.000)
***
 
Notes: 1) in Thousand of US dollars (ppp).  2) The youth-dependency ratio is the pre-working 
age population (age category 0 to 19 years) to the working-age population (age 20 to 
64).  The elderly-dependency ratio is represented by the ratio of the population in the 
retirement phase (aged 65 and over) to the working-age population.  3) Source: 
OECD.  4) *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively.  5) The model 
includes year dummies for Korea in 1998 and 2002.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2 Model Predictions: Korean Household Saving Rate 
Sources: OECD and IMF Staff Estimate. 
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Demographics.  The fast drop in Korea’s fertility rate led to a significant 
drop in the young-age dependency ratio and is a key reason for the declining 
saving rate.  Going forward, with old-age dependency increasing rapidly with 
an aging population, the saving rate is likely to decline further.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The pension system and the unique features of the labor market reduced 
incentives for saving.  The pension system in Korea has one of the lowest 
replacement and contribution rates in the OECD.  Nonetheless, its 
introduction in 1988 was a break-through for households that relied only on 
personal savings until then for retirement income reducing incentives to save.  
On the other hand, the seniority system in the labor market translates into 
early mandatory company retirement, well below the official retirement age.  
As a result, high life expectancy pushes most retirees to second jobs, 
increasing the effective retirement age
16)
 beyond the official retirement age 
reducing effective retirement period and motive for saving.  In addition, most 
                                           
16) Effective retirement age takes into account households’ response to incentives embedded in 
the pension system and is defined as the average age of exit from the labor force during a 5-
year period.  Labor force (net) exits are estimated by taking the difference in the 
participation rate for each 5-year age group (40 and over) at the beginning of the period and 
the rate for the corresponding age group aged 5-years older at the end of the period. 
Figure A3 Pension Replacement Rates and Effective Retirement Age, 
2000-2007 
Source: OECD. 
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post-retirement employment tends to concentrate in the services, where mom 
and pop shops proliferate with retirement lump-sums used for start-up capital, 
where income growth has been lackluster reducing resources for savings.
17)
 
 
Corporate savings have substituted for some of the household savings.  
Absent any tax distortions and liquidity constraints, households should be 
indifferent between holding their savings directly or indirectly via the savings 
of the firms that they own.  However, in the presence of credit constraints, or 
a weak corporate management culture piercing this corporate veil becomes 
difficult, breaking this neutrality.  While for most of Asia this neutrality does 
not hold, in Korea, the deleveraging of the corporate sector following the 
Asian crisis along with substantial corporate governance reforms appears to 
have provided incentives to reduce savings for households. 
Low interest rates and competition for new market segments in the 
financial system after the Asian crisis fueled credit to the household sector 
                                           
17) Reflecting the large number of self-employed and irregular workers, Korean pension 
system has a low coverage (60% compared to around 85% for the OECD), although 
notionally coverage was made universal in 1999. 
Figure A4 Household and Corporate Savings (in Percent of GDP) 
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and reduced incentives to save.  With less diversification of household 
balance sheets to financial assets, the low interest rate environment reduced 
incentives to save and increased household debt.  The banking sector’s 
increasing shift toward retail lending following the retrenchment of credit 
from the large corporates since 1998 and competition for market share also 
facilitated a period of cheap and easy credit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Going forward demographic factors are likely to push the saving rate even 
lower. One of the lowest fertility rates in the world and an increasing life-
expectancy will translate into an extraordinarily large increase in the old-age 
dependency ratio from 14.5% in 2008 to 65% in 2050.  As a result, more 
people who are currently in the work force and are accumulating assets 
would reduce their saving in the medium term.  
Addressing the seniority system in the labor market and improving the 
pension system would increase formal employment opportunities for the 
aging population and support household incomes and savings.  The 2008 
pension reform will gradually reduce the pension benefit replacement rate 
from the current 60% of wages to 40% by 2028, but does not raise the 
Figure A5 Household
*
 and Corporate Loans 
(in Percent of GDP) 
Notes: * include general loans and loans for housing.  ** Major non banks 
include KDB (until 01), Merchant Banks, Trust account of Banks 
and life insurance companies. 
Source: CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
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contribution rate from its current 9%, reflecting a social choice of low 
contribution and low benefits in Korea.  However, the labor market policies 
are increasing the poverty risk of an aging population as working years do 
not provide sufficient accumulation of assets for the longer life-expectancy. 
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